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ROBERT MCNAMARA: Hello. My name is Robert McNamara. I am a Senior Lecturer in History at Ulster University. Today I'm going to be talking about the AM Collection

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Apartheid South Africa. I will be focusing on the period in the late '80s and the early 1990s, when South Africa transitioned from apartheid to democracy and majority rule was installed in that country.

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What these files contain is an enormous amount of information on the end of apartheid from, undoubtedly, a British perspective, but few external viewers of South Africa had so much interest, but also so much reportage

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on South Africa during that period. Britain had an important role in South Africa. And this, of course, is one of the reasons why the files are so interesting for a variety of reasons.

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Some are historical. Britain had been the colonial power in South Africa from the beginning of the 19th century. It had fought wars against the Afrikaner European population

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of South Africa in the 1880s, and again between 1899 and 1902. After this war, Britain ruled South Africa, but such was the criticism both domestically and abroad to Britain's annexation of the Afrikaner Republics at the start

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of the 20th century that, by 1910, Britain created a dominion of South Africa, the so-called Union of South Africa, which enjoyed the same autonomy from Britain as other dominions

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like Australia and New Zealand had. And South Africa, though, because of its-- basically the European population, which made up about 20% of the population of South Africa,

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was split roughly 2/3 Afrikaners, those who were of Dutch descent, and one third Europeans, who were primarily of British descent. So it's quite important to know that Britain had, I suppose,

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a kith and kin interest in South Africa for much of the 20th century. And during the 20th century, there was a steady stream of people who left Britain for Southern Africa.

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A lot went to Rhodesia, for instance, but quite a lot also ended up in South Africa. So the British government had an interest, in some respects, in the safety and welfare of its kith and kin in South Africa.

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Also, Britain, as a result of its political involvement in South Africa, had a considerable economic stake. Much of the most prosperous businesses in South Africa had strong British connections.

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Britain was the largest overseas investor in South Africa for much of the 20th century, and this would continue down until the 1980s. So this kind of sets the context in a way of why Britain,

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while it would have liked apartheid to be dismantled, it also wanted to ensure that its interests in particularly the population of British descent were to an extent protected, but also that its economic stake was

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protected. For those who are unfamiliar with the British Archives and how the interaction between government departments works, I'm going to talk a little bit about, I suppose,

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the mechanics of the British government. The two main departments that I am have digitised are the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Records from for the 1980s through to the early 1990s.

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But also, for the first time, the prime minister's office files the so-called prem files under the prime ministership of Margaret Thatcher and John Major from 1979 to 1994. These, as I've said before, contain an enormous wealth

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of detail on South and Southern Africa during this period. And they are probably one of the richest collections outside South Africa for the study of the region. And let me just say a little bit about how the prime minister's

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office interacts with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office is obviously the Department of State in Britain that deals with Foreign Affairs.

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However, during the course of the 20th century, prime ministers have taken a growing interest in foreign affairs, and they've also had the ability through technological developments to have a more direct control over

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foreign affairs. And it is sometimes said that British prime ministers are actually their own foreign secretary rather than the foreign secretary themselves.

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So in some senses, there's an argument to say that the prime minister's office files on South Africa are more important because they tell you what's going on at the centre of government regarding the formulation of policy.

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But let me explain more generally about how the Foreign and Commonwealth Office works. The Foreign and Commonwealth office is made up of, obviously, the Secretary of State, the junior ministers, and below that

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the civil servants who range from the permanent under-secretary at the start to a series of deputy under-secretaries who are in charge of the geographical graphical

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departments of the Foreign Office. In this case here, you would have a deputy undersecretary in charge of the Central and South African departments, as it's called at some stages, and at other times, the South

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African Department. And these-- basically, they manage Britain's Foreign Affairs on a day-to-day basis with these regions and with the countries within these regions.

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Now one place that I-- the other kind of major day-to-day operator of British foreign policy are the British embassies and the British ambassadors on the ground.

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During the period under review, that I'm going to focus on primarily, the ambassador is Robin Renwick, who was there from 1987 to 1991. I think he's a very important figure in Britain's interactions

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with South Africa, both with the South African government, but also with the opposition, including the ANC. Afterwards, he is replaced by a diplomat called Tony Reeve. I have to say Reeve is perhaps not as effective an ambassador,

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partly because I think he comes in during the middle of the period of transition. And he has perhaps not the experience that Robin Renwick has of the whole South African region.

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So I think Renwick is very important. Reeve is obviously important, but not as important as Renwick, who seems to have this enviable book of contacts, and also the ear of the foreign Secretary, Geoffrey Howe.

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And then later-- but also of Margaret Thatcher, whom who I think respects him greatly. Renwick first comes to prominence as he's one of the key figures in the negotiation

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of the Rhodesia settlement in 1979 and 1980. And he makes his reputation there as an expert on Southern Africa, but also someone who is very able and can do good work.

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And for that reason, he is appointed Ambassador to South Africa in 1987. Now so the ambassador communicates to the Foreign Office, and then the Foreign Office

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communicates to the prime minister's office what they think is the most important information the prime minister requires. Now this is done perhaps in a slightly odd manner.

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The foreign Secretary does not send letters usually, he does occasionally, to the prime minister directly. It is usually the private secretary to the foreign Secretary who writes to the private secretary

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of the prime minister. And now I have to say, most of the private secretaries to the foreign Secretary are not really significant players in their own right.

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But during the 1980s, particularly the late-- from the late 1980s onwards, the private secretary of the foreign-- to the prime minister is a man called Charles Powell.

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It's spelled "Powell," but he likes to be referred to as "Pole." And Powell is one of the most important civil servants of the late 20th century.

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And he has the ability to read the mind, almost, of Margaret Thatcher, and tell her what he wants to say. He reinforces both her best points, but also, in some respects, her prejudices.

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He is a highly influential figure who, I think, in the end, arouses much jealousy from people both in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office because of his power as gatekeeper to the prime minister.

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And they also resent, in some respect, the fact that he's actually a diplomat himself, but he is actually, in a sense, defected and become the prime minister's chief interlocutor, or chief hatchet man in some cases.

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And so he's a very influential figure. And he often summarises the material from the Foreign Office that goes to the prime minister. But he also has a role himself in carrying out

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kind of minor negotiations and interpreting what people are saying. So he is a key figure. So you'll often find in the prime minister's office files

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the so-called prem files, particularly during the Thatcher era, the signature, and the printing of Charles Powell's on many of the documents. When Margaret Thatcher resigns at the end of 1990,

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Charles Powell stays on for a little while under John Major. He's replaced as Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs, essentially, to the prime minister by Stephen Wall and then Roderic Lyne.

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They are both foreign office diplomats accounted to the prime minister. And they're both very able men, but they do not have, I think, the same influence over major and importance as Charles Powell

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did. If I was to pick out one set of papers that I think are particularly important, it is between 1991 and 1994 where you have a huge amount of correspondence and records

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of meetings between John Major and Nelson Mandela, and FW de Klerk, and also Chief Buthelezi, the leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party, who is often kind of a disruptive force

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in the transition to democracy in the early 1990s. And I think if you're interested in Nelson Mandela, for instance, this is one of the great primary sources for hearing what he's thinking during this incredibly important period

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in the early 1990s. I suppose in some senses, these are-- when you're talking about government documents in the 20th century, these are the cream of the crop in many respects.

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These are the files that are held in 10 Downing Street. They're maintained, technically, by the Cabinet Office, but they are, generally speaking, the material that comes across the prime minister's desk.

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So you may have seen the red boxes that British ministers have. They're these red boxes that the ministers take home with them at the end of the day and they

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have to read the material within them, sometimes sign things so that matters are actioned, et cetera, and they then are put back in to the files. They are also-- the file that these particular files

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are divided by subject. They range, in the Thatcher era, from things like the privatisation of electricity, and gas, and British telecoms, through to security issues, home affairs.

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But the ones that we're looking at are, of course, relate to foreign affairs. And again, a bit like the Foreign Office, they are usually by geographical region or by topic.

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So there are a sequence in the prem 19 series, which is the series of prem that refers to both Mrs. Thatcher and then later John Major's governments. When Tony Blair comes to power, it becomes PREM 49.

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So these are the working documents of the prime minister's office. I think in terms of the period we're looking at, there are roughly 30 PREM files relating to South Africa.

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There are a couple more that relate to other aspects of the conflict in South Africa in the 1980s such as Mozambique, but also Angola. But the heart of the collection are the ones

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that deal with South Africa. On average, they contain between 300 and 400 documents, which means that there are some 12,000-odd documents in the files.

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So we're talking about the equivalent of reading 60 books if you read all of them very closely. But these are, of course, something that are filled over the course of some 15 years.

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And they contain the most important dispatches from British ambassadors such as Robin Renwick and Tony Reeve in South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s. But they also contain the letters

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between the foreign secretary's private secretary to the private secretary to the prime minister, asking questions about meetings between the prime minister and foreign dignitaries, providing briefing notes

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to the prime minister, et cetera. These are then often, as I said, summarised. Now you will see occasionally on many of these documents Margaret Thatcher's handwriting on them.

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You will sometimes see her famous vigorous underlining of things that-- well, sometimes it's hard to tell whether she agrees or disagrees with them,

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or is she just emphasising them for importance. Though you will occasionally see, under some suggestions, "no," or "yes," or ticks and things like that give you an insight into Margaret Thatcher's mindset about

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certain-- or thinking about certain issues. Now you will rarely see documents that are actually written by Margaret Thatcher herself.

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Sometimes you will see summaries of what she said taken down by the private secretary, some such as Charles Powell that will then be sent back, maybe to query something that the Foreign Office have sent on to Downing Street.

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So you have-- these files represent, I suppose, the interaction between one of the most powerful prime ministers of the 20th century and her foreign secretaries during that period.

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And they are crucial for understanding British policy towards Southern Africa in the 1980s and early 1990s. The major difference, I think, between the PREM files and the FCO files, which are mainly

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contained in the file categories FCO 105 and then later FCO 169, which are at the heart of the collection, is simply the scale of them. The FCO documents basically collect, usually

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by subject, virtually everything that comes across the desk, either of the British embassy in Pretoria or across the department, the Central and Southern African Department that looks after the region.

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I think as far as I know, there's something along the lines of about 2,000 to 3,000 files between 1980 and 1994 in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office files covering a vast range of subjects that never crossed

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the prime minister's desk. So in terms of scale, you're looking at about 40 times as many foreign office files related to Southern Africa as you are in the PREM file

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series. So if you want immense detail about what's going on in South Africa during the 1980s and the 1990s, I think this resource is, in many ways, incomparable.

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You will not get anything like it, perhaps, in any other non-South African archive. And even then, I think you will find documents here talking about things where probably there is no documentary evidence

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in the South African archives, either in Fort Hare, for instance, for the African National Congress, or in the South African National Archives in Pretoria. In the 1960s and the early 1970s,

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I think British ministers, British diplomats found it very hard to envisage that apartheid would ever come to an end. There was a widespread feeling, I think, among many observers of South Africa

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that quite simply the stakes were too high for the White population of South Africa in terms of the political and economic power that they enjoyed for them to ever give it up.

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And really, there was also the fact that to the North of South Africa, there was a vast cordon sanitaire made up of the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola,

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and even the rebel British colony of Rhodesia. And this meant that it was virtually impossible for any external force to threaten South Africa for really the period from the First

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World War-- well, actually, from the union of South Africa through to the middle of the 1970s. In the early 1960s when Black South Africans,

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led by the African National Congress, including its key leader Nelson Mandela, revolted against the South African government, the South African government was able to defeat it to a large

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extent with ease. It had arrested the key leadership of the African National Congress, including Mandela, and sentenced them to long periods in prison in the early

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1960s. And for many white South Africans, the late 1960s seemed to be this golden age of peace and tranquillity as far as they were concerned,

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with the Black African population cowed by state repression. And it seemed that apartheid would last forever. And many external observers thought much the same.

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Now everything changes in the middle of the 1970s, and almost kind of in the sense that they say that when a butterfly flaps its wings in the Pacific, it can cause a storm in the Atlantic.

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In 1974, the butterfly flaps its wings in Lisbon, and this causes the military coup in Lisbon and that year leads to the rapid disintegration of the Portuguese empire and the collapse of Portuguese rule

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in both Angola and Mozambique. Suddenly, South Africa's cordon sanitaire is gone. And in 1980, the last vestiges of this cordon sanitaire to the North, the rebel British colony of Rhodesia

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accepts black majority rule. Suddenly, South Africa becomes the focus of the world's attention, its racial policies of apartheid, which had been really considered unacceptable by most people

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since their implementation after 1948, and now became the most pressing racial problem in the world. And there was also the sense that the once-impregnable apartheid state was now

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under more pressure, both externally and internally, than ever before. And really, from the middle of the 1970s, British ministers and British diplomats could see that

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the possibility that the apartheid regime would fall in the coming years was now a distinct possibility. Though others believed that the apartheid state could hold on more or less in perpetuity.

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In the 1970s and for much of the 1980s, the British government viewed a post-apartheid future perhaps not in terms of majority rule, but perhaps in terms of a federal solution, or something where group rights,

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that means the rights of whites, but also of the different African tribal groups, as well as the coloureds and the Indian population of South Africa, they would have specific rights that would allow them, to a large extent,

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vetoes of other groups dominating them. I suppose in some respects, what you might call it is a kind of a Swiss-style solution where the central government is quite weak while the local cantons

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enjoyed the bulk of the power. And many people saw this as one possible solution to the problem of apartheid and a post-apartheid future. But others denounced this because they saw this

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as both unworkable from a government perspective, but also essentially it would allow the White population to maintain disproportionate economic and political power. I think for a long time, Margaret Thatcher

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was quite wedded to some kind of solution that would entrench the power and the economic interests of Whites. Why did she think this?

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First of all, Margaret Thatcher was a conservative prime minister. Reflexively, she was sympathetic to the cause of the Whites in Southern Africa.

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Now she was not an apologist for apartheid, full stop. But she understood the fears and concerns of the White population of South Africa and did not view it simply in terms of right and wrong and racism,

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which is how a great deal of liberal and progressive opinion throughout the world viewed the problem of apartheid. Now Thatcher was conditioned by her own intrinsic conservatism. Also, her dislike of the Black opposition and its vanguard

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movement, the African National Congress, which she considered far too closely wedded to communism and the Soviet Union. And for a long time, she could barely

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conceal her distaste for the African National Congress. So Thatcher looked instead to less important Black leaders, particularly Chief Buthelezi, a significant leader of the Zulu population, and later the leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party.

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Buthelezi spoke the language that Margaret Thatcher understood. He spoke of free markets. He was fanatically anti-communist himself.

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And she viewed this, and Buthelezi, as a possible solution to South Africa's problems. She was also influenced by the South African writer Laurens van der Post, who was one of these people

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who very strongly believed in the tribal characteristics of Africans and that any solution that did not acknowledge, in a sense, the different tribes of South Africa was not going to work.

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And Thatcher, I think, remained wedded to the Buthelezi option far too late. Thatcher was also deeply opposed to economic sanctions against South Africa.

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And actually, a lot of the correspondence in the PREM files is taken up with how do we frustrate both domestic and international calls for sanctions against South Africa?

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The calls for sanctions reached a crescendo in 1984, after the Black uprising broke out in the African townships of South Africa, such as Soweto in 1984.

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This was the Black response to the introduction of a new South African Constitution, which had two major points of interest. One was the creation of an executive president. So the prime minister, PW Botha, now

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became president of South Africa, but with the full powers over the government. And it also created a three bicameral parliament. There was a chamber for the White population.

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There was also an elected chamber for the coloured population and a chamber for the Indian population of South Africa. But there was no chamber for the Black African population,

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which made up some 80% of the population of South Africa. This, you might describe as reform, by the South African government to broaden the basis of its support, instead created

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an enormous backlash by the African population against the government. And South Africa, from that point onwards in 1984, suffered from virtual endemic riot, violence, and murder

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really until the end of apartheid. And actually the violence that was unleashed in 1984 has continued to the present day with the very high levels of violence in South Africa.

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Britain also feared the spread of communism through Southern Africa that had become a danger as far as they were concerned, from the middle of the 1970s. The collapse of the Portuguese empire

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had seen its replacement by left wing regimes supported in the case of Angola by the Soviet Union and Cuba, and in the case of Mozambique, by just a basically socialist regime that had nationalised much of the private business

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of the country. And then in 1980, an avowed Marxist, Robert Mugabe, had come to power in the first free elections in Zimbabwe. So, to a large extent, Thatcher, who was very,

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very anti-communist, and indeed was anti-statist more generally, in the 1980s, Britain underwent an economic revolution from the right, to a large extent, and Margaret Thatcher not only did not want to see socialism and nationalisation beaten

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at home in Britain. She also did not want to see it suddenly implemented in South Africa if a party like the African National Congress came to power, which was overtly committed

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to state control of much of the economy of South Africa. So Thatcher successfully resisted sanctions. One reason she gave for opposing sanctions was, she said, that it gave Britain influence in the highest

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councils in South Africa. So in a sense, she suggested that not introducing sanctions allowed her to talk to PW Botha and hopefully shape some kind of reform in South Africa.

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The problem was this did not really work out. And there was a big effort by the Commonwealth. It sent an eminent persons group to South Africa in 1986 to try to see if there was some way of negotiating

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a peaceful settlement to what had become a very violent situation. This eminent persons group, which appeared to be on the verge of making

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some kind of breakthrough, its mission collapsed when South Africa launched a series of cross-border raids in 1986 aimed at alleged African National Congress's military wing,

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MKs bases in places like Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and Botswana. This collapsed the eminent persons group mission. And it became clear that PW Botha's talk of reform were essentially empty words.

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And after that, for a period, I think Thatcher lost any kind of interest in moving South Africa along the path of reform, primarily because she saw it as impossible.

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But she still remained very opposed to any increase in the range of economic sanctions against South Africa, though much of the Western world, including the United States, was implementing

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a stronger and stronger measures against the South African economy. So Thatcher, in a sense, was becoming an increasingly lonely voice in her opposition to mandatory sanctions

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against South Africa. And there's an argument to say the sanctions were beginning to have an effect. South Africa became increasingly frozen out of international

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money markets, and as its budget deficits began to increase in the 1980s, the apartheid state came under significant economic pressure for the first time. And this kind of, in a sense, weakened its position

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in the late 1980s. So there's an argument to say that Margaret Thatcher's refusal to implement sanctions against South Africa actually slowed down the progress to a solution.

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There's an argument to say that, though, that this is not strictly true. The main barrier to any kind of progress in dismantling apartheid was PW Botha,

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the president of South Africa. He had essentially returned to type a hardline opposition to any kind of significant reform, our bringing Blacks into the political process.

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Now there were kind of back channels between the African National Congress and the South African government beginning to take shape. Afrikaner intellectual opinion was increasingly uncomfortable

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with apartheid. There was a well-known document produced by the Afrikaner Broederbond, which argued for reform and for a new political dispensation in South Africa,

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which struck many as a sign of increasing change in the mindset of the Afrikaner population, which most people saw as rigid and unyielding. But both himself, who had spoken of reform frequently

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in the early 1980s, had now kind of become the major roadblock to any reform by the end of the decade. But then in 1989, he was struck down by a stroke. And he resigned as leader of the National Party

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and subsequently as president of South Africa in that year. He was replaced by his successor, FW de Klerk. de Klerk had been seen in the early 1980s very much as a hardline Afrikaner, but he came from a family that had

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intellectuals within it who were influential in the wider Afrikaner world, notably his brother, Wilhelm de Klerk. But FW de Klerk stunned the world at the beginning of 1990 by announcing the unbanning of the ANC and the Pan-African

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Congress, and the release of Nelson Mandela. He also began to announce the rapid dismantling of some of the key tenets of apartheid. So there's an argument to say that Margaret Thatcher was

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right, that apartheid did not require economic sanctions to bring it down. It required a change in the mindset of the South African leadership.

00:37:50.340 - 00:38:02.780

And this had taken place in 1989. Now one of the reasons for this, though, was the end of the Cold War. Suddenly, to say that communism was unfashionable

00:38:02.780 - 00:38:17.150

would be an understatement. And suddenly the ANC's Marxist ideology now suddenly seemed as bankrupt, in some respects, as the ideology of apartheid.

00:38:17.150 - 00:38:44.650

And I think this provided the openings and opportunities for the rapid dismantling of apartheid after 1990. Violence became endemic in South Africa from 1984. There was a state of emergency imposed

00:38:44.650 - 00:39:02.390

by the South African government that lasted until 1991, when it was finally ended. But violence continued in South Africa. Even after Nelson Mandela was released,

00:39:02.390 - 00:39:14.480

the violence did not decrease. It actually increased. The most deadly conflict was between supporters of the African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom

00:39:14.480 - 00:39:32.600

Party, which represented Zulus and was led, of course, by Chief Buthelezi. And from 1989, really, until 1994, battles raged, particularly in Natal, but also

00:39:32.600 - 00:39:50.060

in the townships surrounding the major industrial areas between supporters of the ANC and Inkatha. All during this period, the ANC claimed that this violence was being orchestrated either directly

00:39:50.060 - 00:40:03.150

by the South African government or rogue elements within the security forces. And there's long been a debate as to how much the people, like FW de Klerk, knew about this.

00:40:03.150 - 00:40:12.910

For a long time, the British government did not necessarily believe the ANC's agency's claims of government collusion. There's a few documents that you can see in both the FCO

00:40:12.910 - 00:40:29.290

files and the PREM files, which suggest that the British thought a lot of the fighting between the ANC and Inkatha was just because they were both battling for political supremacy, particularly in Natal.

00:40:29.290 - 00:40:45.470

But it has emerged since, and it became clear from 1992 onwards, that elements within both the South African government and the South African security establishment had provided fuel for the fire of this conflict.

00:40:45.470 - 00:41:03.820

And actually, the ANC's actually correct belief in this collusion between the South African government and Inkatha Carter probably delayed the transition to democracy in South Africa because it led to a series of repeated interruptions

00:41:03.820 - 00:41:20.130

of constitutional negotiations, because the ANC, when they learnt of new revelations about South African government involvement with Inkatha and the violence, they would pull out of the negotiations,

00:41:20.130 - 00:41:32.720

and relations with the South African government would become very frosty. And actually, one of the things that you will find in the files is the attempts by the British government, both the British

00:41:32.720 - 00:41:46.400

Ambassador in South Africa, first Robin Renwick, and then later Tony Reeve, but also by John Major himself, and by visiting British ministers to try to smooth the waters between the South

00:41:46.400 - 00:42:18.110

African government and the African National Congress. One of the richest, I think, documents within these files is those meetings between British ministers and Mandela and South African ministers, including the President de

00:42:18.110 - 00:42:28.500

Klerk. But also the correspondence between John Major in particular, and Mandela, and de Klerk, which was always encouraging.

00:42:28.500 - 00:42:42.750

Strangely enough, when Mandela is released in February 1990, it's also the beginning of Margaret Thatcher's last year in office. She leaves office in November 1990.

00:42:42.750 - 00:42:55.320

It's fairly clear that because of her opposition to economic sanctions against South Africa, she is greatly mistrusted by much of the African National Congress.

00:42:55.320 - 00:43:09.140

Indeed, she continues to distrust the African National Congress. And there's one memorable document in the FCO files, where Robin Renwick is giving out

00:43:09.140 - 00:43:25.860

about the absurd economics of the ANC. And you can see that this is kind of very motivated by the Thatcherite view of the world and economics at the time.

00:43:25.860 - 00:43:43.760

So there's files-- it's well worth reading some of the files in the FCO series on the South African Communist Party, for instance, and the hostility that's often shown to it. But I think, generally speaking, John Major, far more

00:43:43.760 - 00:43:58.160

than Margaret Thatcher, had a positive role in the transition. And he does seem to get on very well with both Nelson Mandela and FW de Klerk, with one exception. During 1992 was probably the most tense year

00:43:58.160 - 00:44:15.040

of the transition to democracy in South Africa. There is an increased mistrust between the African National Congress and Mandela on one side and the National party and de Klerk on the other side because it

00:44:15.040 - 00:44:29.230

is becoming clearer and clearer that there is collusion between elements of the South African government and security forces and Inkatha. And Mandela increasingly believes that the South African

00:44:29.230 - 00:44:45.880

government is doing this because it wants to weaken the ANC before elections and create a kind of an anti-ANC coalition. And you often see in 1992, the correspondence

00:44:45.880 - 00:45:00.370

between John Major and Mandela, for instance, gets less and less. And it's not until 1993 that you see it restored. And 1993 is because the relationship between Mandela

00:45:00.370 - 00:45:15.780

and de Klerk improves once more, mainly because de Klerk begins to acknowledge that there's a lot of dirty tricks and collusion between the security forces and Inkatha to disrupt the ANC.

00:45:15.780 - 00:45:29.570

And in December 1992, for instance, there's a famous Night or Day of the Generals, it's sometimes called, where de Klerk sacks many of the senior leaders in the army and the police

00:45:29.570 - 00:45:40.730

who have been involved, or at least are alleged to be involved in the collusion. And I think that begins to restore confidence. And it's actually the negotiation

00:45:40.730 - 00:45:57.930

of the Constitution of a post-apartheid South Africa. While it is fraught with difficulties, generally speaking, the National party and the ANC come to agreements in 1993 relatively quickly.

00:45:57.930 - 00:46:11.500

And by the end of the year, it is clear that elections, free and fair, one man, one vote, will be held in the early part of 1994. And this, of course, is welcomed by the British government.

00:46:11.500 - 00:46:32.470

The major fly in the ointment, and this is one where Britain, again, has an involvement, is that right-wing Afrikaners, the AWP, the Conservative Party, a new grouping around ex-South African Defence Force generals and the Volksfront,

00:46:32.470 - 00:46:46.610

together with Inkatha, are all extremely dissatisfied with the constitutional agreement between the ANC and the South African government. And they pledged to boycott the elections.

00:46:46.610 - 00:47:05.730

And it looks like those elections will either take place in a kind of an atmosphere of incredible political violence and they will be boycotted by an important groups within South African society.

00:47:05.730 - 00:47:21.980

And from the end of 1993 through the early part of 1994, the British government exercises a large amount of effort, together with other governments, particularly the American government, in trying

00:47:21.980 - 00:47:43.910

to get both the South African right and Chief Buthelezi on board and taking part in the elections. And I think their role is quite important in allowing the elections to go ahead with the participation

00:47:43.910 - 00:48:02.380

of both right wing Afrikaners in the Freedom Front under General Viljoen and Chief Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party. And this is kind of-- well, a triumph of British diplomacy

00:48:02.380 - 00:48:11.200

is probably too far, but certainly it's one where I think Britain exercised a good influence on the whole process. And I think John Major comes out of it

00:48:11.200 - 00:48:29.470

looking very well from the documents that are here. It is usually taken as a given, during the 1980s, that both the Foreign Secretary, Geoffrey Howe, and the officials in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office would

00:48:29.470 - 00:48:48.070

have liked to have seen a more robust attitude to the South African government than Margaret Thatcher wanted to take. I'm not sure this is entirely correct. First of all, I think Margaret Thatcher was perhaps

00:48:48.070 - 00:49:03.140

not as pro-apartheid, and perhaps as racist as some people make out. I think that would be her opposition to economic sanctions is deeply held, and it almost seems

00:49:03.140 - 00:49:15.950

like a philosophical rejection of them. She's undoubtedly motivated as well by kind of strategic considerations, and anti-communism as well.

00:49:15.950 - 00:49:35.330

But I think if you look at a lot of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office files, while ambassadors bemoan the behaviour of the apartheid government, it does not mean that they are card carrying members of the African National Congress either.

00:49:35.330 - 00:49:56.020

And Robin Renwick, for instance, while he gets on very well with Mandela, is by no means a fan of the ANC either. He's often very sceptical about it. And so I think looking at the files in the round,

00:49:56.020 - 00:50:10.090

the division of opinion between Thatcher and Sir Geoffrey Howe, her Foreign Secretary, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office at least are not perhaps as great as some would have might imagined.

00:50:10.090 - 00:50:26.230

And there's a famous kind of phrase attributed to Margaret Thatcher, that the home office represents the interests of the home office in Britain, while the foreign office represents

00:50:26.230 - 00:50:45.620

the interests of foreigners in Britain is not actually correct. In fact, the foreign office was amazingly adaptable to the views of the various governments that it served under since the Second World War.

00:50:45.620 - 00:50:58.680

The officials, in most cases, even if they're not inside a political-- behave very carefully and circumspect and apolitically most of the time.

00:50:58.680 - 00:51:12.940

What I would say one exception, and that is Margaret Thatcher's Private Secretary, Charles Powell, who is, I would say, a card-carrying Thatcherite, as I could best describe him.

00:51:22.490 - 00:51:40.340

Well, I would emphasise, generally speaking, that Britain played a positive and encouraging role, it has to be borne in mind of the limitations of external actors in the end of apartheid and the transition

00:51:40.340 - 00:51:50.690

to democracy in South Africa. In the end, it's South Africans who have to live there. And in the end, it's South Africans who have to agree between themselves

00:51:50.690 - 00:52:05.290

about the future and the way forward. And generally speaking, this happens eventually between 1990 and 1994. Now there would be one, perhaps, place

00:52:05.290 - 00:52:22.240

where I would say the British government, and more widely the international community, have a role. And that is when Chief Buthelezi right up till the last minute before the 1994 elections in April of that year

00:52:22.240 - 00:52:35.140

threatens to boycott the elections and bring down lots of violence upon South Africa. Both the British and the American governments, and other members of the international community,

00:52:35.140 - 00:52:47.320

made clear to Buthelezi that he's going to be isolated. And they basically tried to pressure him into coming on board. And while in the end, I think there

00:52:47.320 - 00:53:02.870

are enough concessions given by Mandela and the ANC to satisfy some of his political demands for particularly a more federal solution to the future of South Africa, I think this international opinion

00:53:02.870 - 00:53:15.440

is helpful in the end, because Buthelezi-- basically, it's made clear to him that he is going to be an isolated figure who will lose whatever influence he has with the international community if he goes ahead

00:53:15.440 - 00:53:37.280

with his boycott of the election. I think it doesn't come through much in the prime minister's office papers. There are some files in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

00:53:37.280 - 00:53:54.050

where in the period from 1990 to about 1992, they do discuss various models of a future kind of political dispensation in South Africa that is not simply majority rule.

00:53:54.050 - 00:54:06.310

And these kind of files end about 1992, where it's basically accepted that it's going to be one man, one vote, and whether they're going to be transitional arrangements made.

00:54:06.310 - 00:54:22.420

Eventually, South Africa will be governed by the party that gets the majority of the votes, which is obviously going to be, and for a long time was going to be the African National Congress, which had been the vanguard of African nationalism

00:54:22.420 - 00:54:39.370

in South Africa from really the 1940s onwards. I think the British government comes to the conclusion that it's not for them in the end, unlike in, maybe, the 1970s and 1980s, where they were thinking a lot about

00:54:39.370 - 00:54:53.330

various types of governmental structure in a post-apartheid South Africa. I think in the early 1990s, they come to the conclusion that South Africans need to make up their minds about what they want

00:54:53.330 - 00:55:04.740

for the future and whatever is going to end violence, and whatever is going to bring an end to apartheid in a reasonably peaceful manner is going to be acceptable to the British government.

00:55:04.740 - 00:55:13.940

And it's not for them to be kind of going, you should have a federal solution. Oh, there should be a group rights entrenched in it. I think for a long time, they think

00:55:13.940 - 00:55:29.900

that's the only game in town. But once they realise that the South African government and de Klerk are kind of fairly early on, while looking for safeguards, are basically accepting of one man, one vote,

00:55:29.900 - 00:55:39.240

I think they-- I think the British government's view is they should leave constitutional arrangements and constitution making to the people of South Africa,

00:55:39.240 - 00:55:42.340

rather than in Whitehall.